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Does stronger patent enforcement stimulate innovation activities? 
After the 1994 Korean patent reform, a substantial increase in the 
number of patent applications in the electronics and related equip- 
ment industries has been observed. This paper investigates how 
stronger patent enforcement affected the activities of firm innovation 
and whether the observed upsurge of patenting propensity is attrib- 
utable to the increase in innovation activities. The regression results 
show that incumbents with large fixed capital strategically responded 
to patent enforcement by substantially increasing patent applications, 
but not research and development intensity. The results were con- 
sistent with the strategic response hypothesis and suggested that 
the 1994 Korean patent enforcement did not stimulate the innovation 
activities of firms. 
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JEL Classification: L5, L6, O3
I. Introduction
The effectiveness of strong intellectual property rights as an innovation 
incentive mechanism has been a controversial issue among economists 
and policy makers. People favoring strong patent protection argue that 
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it provides stable economic opportunities to appropriate innovation results 
and offers strong incentive for inventors to stimulate innovation activities. 
However, skeptics argue that the effectiveness of strong patent protection 
is different across industries, and depends on the characteristics of the 
technological field. For instance, Cohen et al. (2000) argue that the 
appropriations of firms in “discrete product industries,” such as the 
pharmaceutical or chemical industry, rely heavily on legal protection, 
whereas firms in “complex product industries,” such as the electronics 
and machine industries, are more likely to protect their innovations 
through “secrecy” or “technological lead-time.” The rapid pace of tech- 
nological development is also likely to decrease the marginal contribution 
of legal protection.
The controversy is still ongoing in theoretical and empirical literature. 
Some comparative country studies document the positive effect of a 
stronger patent system on economic growth (Gould and Gruben 1996; 
Kanwar and Evenson 2003; Dincer 2007), whereas other studies based 
on firm-level micro analysis find no positive effect of stronger patent on 
the innovation activity of firms (Jaffe 2000; Hall and Ziedonis 2001; 
Sakakibara and Branstetter 2001). 
In this study, we examine whether stronger patent enforcement through 
the Korean patent reform in 1994 stimulates the innovation activities of 
the private sector. In 1994, the Korean government expanded the duration 
of patent right from 15 to 20 years, and reinforced inventor rights cor- 
responding to the protection level outlined by the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs). Therefore, the 1994 patent reform 
effectively raised Korean intellectual property rights to the level of ad- 
vanced countries and offered a natural experiment to assess the economic 
effect of stronger patent reform on innovation. 
This analysis focuses on the electronics and related equipment industry 
because this industry exhibited a significant increase in patent applica- 
tions immediately following the 1994 patent reform, whereas other in- 
dustries, such as the chemical or pharmaceutical industries, did not. 
Such phenomenon is somewhat paradoxical as the electronics and related 
equipment industry have substantially complex, rapidly progressive, and 
cumulative technological characteristics. According to Cohen et al. (2000), 
firms in “complex product industries” are generally expected to be less 
reliant on legal protection and to show modest response to the patent 
reform. We investigate this disjuncture between theoretical prediction and 
reality, and attempt to understand the motivations behind the observed 
patent increase. Thus, the objective of this study is twofold. We first 
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examine whether stronger patent regulation stimulates the innovation 
activity of firms, and then, we identify the strategic behavior of incum- 
bents that is attributable to the 1994 patent reform. 
One of our key empirical findings is that the response of large firms 
is quite different from the responses of small to medium-sized companies. 
After the patent reform, large incumbents with high fixed costs signifi- 
cantly increased the number of patent applications without increasing 
R&D spending, whereas small to medium-sized firms showed no signifi- 
cant changes, either in the number of patent applications or in R&D 
spending. The result implies consistency with the “strategic response 
hypothesis,” which states that firms with high fixed costs tend to increase 
patent applications under a stronger patent regime to avoid nuisance 
patent litigations or patent “hold-up” problems. The empirical results, 
thus, suggest that the 1994 Korean patent reform did not stimulate the 
innovation activities of the private sector, but caused a strategic response 
among large firms to fence the market against potential entrants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly 
reviews related theoretical and empirical literature, and describes the 
1994 Korean patent reform. Section III discusses the data and sample 
used for estimation, and delineates the econometric model. Section IV 
presents the regression results, and section V concludes this study.
II. Patent Reform and Innovation Activity of Korean Firms
A. Literature Review
Theoretical literature on patent and innovation activity has formally 
proved the relationship between patent scope and optimal innovation 
effort, and that government policy makers and public interest groups 
have advocated strong patent protection. However, contrary to this com- 
mon perception, recent empirical studies offer mixed results regarding 
the effect of patent enforcement on innovation activities. Kanwar and 
Evenson (2003) utilize cross-country panel R&D investment data from 
1981 to 1995 and argue that more stringent protection of intellectual 
property right provides a significant incentive with inventors to spur in- 
novation. Stronger intellectual property right increases R&D expenditure 
not only in developed countries but also in developing countries. Yueh 
(2009) explores whether the reform of patent laws in China has resulted 
in innovation by using 29 regional data sets from 1991 to 2003. Despite 
criticism on imperfect legal enforcement, the reform of the patent law 
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system has produced a stock of patents that has grown rapidly along- 
side economic growth. Nevertheless, the imperfect IPR system of China 
generates innovation as the country develops and hinges on the key 
factor of researchers. 
However, some studies focusing on the relatively short-term and micro- 
economic effects of stronger patent reform found no significant empirical 
evidence of spurred innovation activities. Kortum and Lerner (1999) in- 
vestigate the cause of an unprecedented surge of US patenting in the 
1990s. Using both international and domestic data on patent application 
and awards, they found that the upsurge of patenting is attributable to 
an increase in US innovation spurred by changes in the management of 
research rather than institutional changes.
Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) examine the effect of an expansion 
of patent scope in 1988 on firm innovation activities by using data ob- 
tained from 307 Japanese firms, and argue that the marginal effect of 
stronger patent is quite modest. They found no empirical evidence that 
the Japanese patent reform has spurred either R&D spending or innov- 
ation output in the private sector. 
Meanwhile, Cohen et al. (2000) show that the importance of patent 
protection and the degree of patent dependency are quite different among 
industries, and are based on the approach of each industry to protect 
against the appropriation of innovation. According to the Carnegie-Mellon 
Survey, firms perceive secrecy, technological lead-time, and patent rights 
as important mechanisms for appropriating the economic benefit of in- 
novation, but patent is the least important instrument among them.1 
They show that patent is overall the least important tool for protecting 
firm innovation outputs, and no industry indicates patent to be the most 
effective instrument.
Studies on firm behavior using industrial data from the US also found 
no empirical evidence to support the idea that strengthened patent rights 
spurred innovation in the private sector. Using US R&D data, Jaffe 
(2000) finds that expanded patent rights did not induce more innovative 
activities in firms. Jaffe (2000) argues that R&D investment in the US 
had increased before the patent enforcement, and that expanded patent 
rights did not contribute to innovation.
1 Secrecy was the dominant mechanism in the chemical and semiconductor 
industries, whereas the communications equipment, computer, steel, car, and 
truck industries indicated “lead-time” as the key mechanism. The electrical equip- 
ment sector showed low scores overall, which suggested that the appropriability 
of innovation in that sector was low.
    RESPONSES OF INCUMBENTS TO PATENT ENFORCEMENT 77
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) investigate the US semiconductor industry 
by using data from 1979 to 1995, and  find that strengthened patent 
rights are effective only for R&D-intensive small firms, but not for large 
conglomerates. They further argue that expanded patent rights caused 
a rapid increase in patent applications in the 1980s without associated 
increases in R&D expenditures. 
Mowery and Sampat (2001) provide little evidence of the effect of in- 
stitutional change on innovation activity. Using data on three leading 
universities (University of California, Stanford University, and Columbia 
University), they argue that the Bayh-Dole Act was only one of several 
important factors behind the rise of university patenting and licensing 
activity. Bayh-Dole appears to have little effect on the content of academic 
research at the universities, which revealed similarities in their patent 
and licensing portfolios 10 years after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
Notably, empirical results differ across cases and econometric settings. 
Several studies use patent application data as a proxy variable for in- 
novation activity. The basic assumption is that as R&D activity increases, 
the number of patent applications increases proportionately. However, 
this assumption does not work when firms apply for patent based on 
strategic concerns rather than as an outcome of innovation. In fact, we 
observe significant discordance between R&D expenditure and patenting 
propensity after the 1994 Korean patent reform, which is discussed in 
more detail in the following section.
B. 1994 Patent Reform and Response of Incumbents
Economic literature on patent reform generally assumes that broader 
patent scope or extended patent length induces more R&D efforts, and 
the positive relationship between patent scope and optimal R&D effort 
is widely accepted by many economists and policy makers. The Korean 
government joined the agreement on TRIPs and expanded a corresponding 
patent scope in December 1993. The most noteworthy change from the 
reform is the expansion of patent duration from 15 to 20 years from 
the date of patent application filing. Through the 11th amendment (1994 
reform), patent protection level is extended to products and processes 
in all fields of technology, which include the patentability of material 
produced by nuclear transformation. The 11th amendment also effectively 
reinforces inventor rights corresponding to the level of TRIPs. Through 
the reform, the patent rights of Korea have reached the level of developed 
countries.
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Note: D15-D16: food products, beverages and tobacco; D17-D19: textiles, textile 
products, leather and footwear; D20-D22: wood, pulp, paper, paper pro- 
ducts, printing and publishing; D23-D25: chemical, rubber, plastics, and 
fuel products; D26-D28: other non-metallic mineral, basic metals, and fab- 
ricated metal products; D29-D35: machinery and equipment and transport 
equipment except D323; D323: electronics and related equipment industry; 
D36-D37: manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling.
Source: Korean Intellectual Property Office (2007).
FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF PATENT APPLICATIONS IN KOREAN MANUFACTURING 
(1990-2006)
Following the patent reform, the number of patent applications in- 
creased significantly, especially in the electronics and related equipment 
industry. Figure 1 presents data from patent applications for Korean 
manufacturing industries from 1990 to 2006. The number of patent ap- 
plications in the electronics and related equipment industry (D323) in- 
creased in 1995, just after the patent reform, and continued to exhibit 
a sharp rise until 1997.2 A similar pattern is observed in the “machinery 
and equipment and transport equipment” industries (D29-35, except 
D323), but no similar response happened in other sectors, which sug- 
gested that the 1994 patent reform may have contributed to a pro- 
patent shift in the Korean manufacturing industry, particularly in the 
electronics and machinery related industry. However, the phenomenon 
observed is quite inconsistent with previous studies and predictions. As 
noted above, the electronics and machinery equipment industries are 
2 However, the number of patent applications substantially decreased from 1998 
to 2001, when Korea experienced financial crisis. 
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Note: R&D Expenditure ＝ million US Dollars at 2000 constant value.
Source: Korean Intellectual Property Office (2007). 
FIGURE 2
R&D INTENSITY BY FIRM SIZE IN D323
characterized by “complex product technology,” and are expected to be 
the least responsive to patent enforcement. 
The responses of incumbents vary across firm size. Figure 2 presents 
the trend of patenting propensity to R&D expenditure of large and small 
to medium-sized firms. Large firms exhibit a sharp increase in patent 
propensity following the 1994 patent reform, whereas small to medium 
firms show little or no significant changes in patenting propensity. This 
upsurge in the patenting propensity of large firms is due to the disparity 
of R&D expenditure and the number of patent applications. Large in- 
cumbents show significant increase in the number of patent applications 
right after the reform, but there is no substantial change in associated 
R&D expenditures. For small to medium-sized firms, we did not observe 
any significant changes either in the number of patent applications or 
in R&D spending after the patent reform. This finding suggests that the 
upsurge of patent applications in large firms can be attributable to the 
patent reform, but the innovation activity measured by R&D intensity 
may not be appreciably affected by the patent reform. 
The data presented in Figure 2 highlight two important issues. First, 
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the innovation activity of industry, which is measurable by R&D expend- 
iture or intensity, seems to have been unaffected by the 1994 patent re- 
form. Second, the comparative volume of patent applications reveals dif- 
ferent behaviors between large and small firms, which suggest that dom- 
inant incumbent firms strategically respond to stronger patent reform by 
aggressively applying for patents to avoid possible nuisance litigations or 
patent “hold-up” problems. We present more accurate econometric models 
to examine whether the observed feature is consistent with statistical an- 
alysis controlling for other factors. 
III. Econometric Model: Patent Production Function
The main objective of this study is to explore whether the Korean pa- 
tent reform of 1994 stimulated innovation efforts in the private sector, 
and if it did not, to investigate the main motivation underlying the sig- 
nificant increase in the patent applications of incumbents in the elec- 
tronics and related equipment industry (D323). The tendency to patent 
is measured by the number of patent applications, while the innovation 
activity of individual firms is measured by real R&D expenditures and 
R&D expenditures per worker. The trends of R&D intensity in Figure 2 
demonstrate that firm size could be an important factor for firm pa- 
tenting behavior. Thus, we split the data and run separate regressions 
across firm size, large versus small to medium-sized firms. 
For the econometric model, we employ a patent production function 
introduced by Pakes and Griliches (1980), and adopt a negative binomial 
regression model to explore incumbent response to patent reform. The 
negative binomial regression model is a Poisson model because the num- 
ber of patents is count-variable. However, the assumption on equality of 
the conditional mean and variance in the Poisson regression model is 
typically taken to be the major shortcoming. Alternatives have been sug- 
gested, and the most common is the negative binomial model, which 
arises from a natural formulation of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The 
negative binomial regression model is an extension of the Poisson re- 
gression model that allows the variance of the process to be different 
from the mean. Thus, the model introduces an unobserved individual 
heterogeneity or over-dispersion into the Poisson model.
For the over-dispersion fixed effect models, let yit be the count for the 
tth observation for firm i. We began with the model yit|γ it ~ Poisson (γ it ), 
where γ it|δ i ~ gamma (λ it, 1/δ i ) with λ it＝exp(Xit β＋ε it ), and δ i was the 
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dispersion parameter. This yields the model:
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When considering only within-group effects, this specification yields a 
negative binomial model for firm i with dispersion (variance divided by 
mean) equal to (1＋δ i ).
We estimate a series of “patent production functions” under various 
specifications that measure whether a change in firm-level patenting 
behavior took place during the period associated with stronger patent 
reform. To estimate the patent production function, R&D expenditures 
or R&D expenditures per worker are first considered as a main deter- 
minant of patent production. Previous studies (Lerner 1995; Lanjouw 
and Lerner 1996; Hall and Ziedonis 2001) argue for economies of scale 
in generating patents because of the fixed cost of maintaining a legal 
department that handles intellectual property rights and related work. 
Thus, we incorporate firm size, which is measured by the number of 
workers, into the regression equation to test for scale effect in firm 
patenting behavior. 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) argue that firms with large sunk costs in 
complex manufacturing facilities are vulnerable to “hold-up” in the new 
US patent regime, and appear to have larger incentives to expand their 
patent portfolios. These firms have to safeguard against the threat of 
costly litigation, and to negotiate access to external technologies on more 
favorable terms. This hypothesis is called the strategic response hy- 
pothesis. Under this hypothesis, the firm with larger sunk costs is ex- 
pected to respond strategically, and to patent more aggressively when 
patent enforcement becomes stronger. Thus, we include the capital in- 
tensity variable ( lnCapint) of firms in the regression equation to test 
whether the strategic response hypothesis is consistent with the case of 
the Korean electronics industry under the stronger patent regime. 
The dummy variable, Post-1994, is also introduced to isolate the effect 
of the institutional change of patent reform. The value of this variable 
is 0 if the year is 1994 or before, and 1 if after 1994. 
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IV. Data Sources and Empirical Results
A. Descriptive Summary
Following Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), we adopt a negative 
binomial regression model for the electronics and related equipment in- 
dustry in Korea during the sample period of 1990 to 2006. We analyze 
how R&D investment and patenting behavior were changed corresponding 
to the patent reform. Two different sources of data are combined based 
on company name and industry code. Data on the number of patent 
applications by individual firms were obtained from the Korean Intellectual 
Property Office, while R&D expenditures, sales, number of workers, and 
tangible fixed assets were retrieved from the Korea Investors Service- 
Financial Analysis System (KIS-FAS).
We focus on the electronics and related equipment industry, which is 
characterized by rapidly changing and cumulative technologies. By focus- 
ing on a specific industry, we expect that we will be able to control in- 
dustrial heterogeneity and to identify more accurately the characteristics 
associated with the R&D activities of individual firms. This study uses 
unbalanced firm-level panel data obtained from 35 individual firms in 
the electronics and related equipment industry, and employs only the firms 
established before 1994 to investigate the responses of incumbents to 
the 1994 patent reform. We also limit our sample to firms with at least 
two-year occurrences in patent applications during the sample period. 
R&D expenditures were deflated by the producer price index to convert 
them to 2000 constant values.3
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the sample used in the 
regression. The maximum number of patent applications by a single 
firm is 17,832 by Samsung Electronics in 2005. This firm also achieved 
the maximum observed value of real R&D spending and the maximum 
number of employees in the sample in 2006, which were 16.3 billion 
US dollars and 85,813 workers, respectively. 
Comparisons of the mean and median in Table 1 exhibit severely skewed 
sample distributions for each variable. The mean of each variable was 
generally larger than the median, which suggests that large firms gen- 
erally dominate innovation activities. The mean value of patent applica- 
tions for each year is up to 545.2, but the median firm usually has zero 
3 R&D expenditure is classified as R&D asset and cost in the KIS-FAS data- 
base. We define R&D expenditure as the sum of those two classifications.
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Variable  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Patent application1 545.2 0.0 2,208.2 0 17,832.0
R&D spending 
(2000 constant million US$)2
180.9 1.4 1,207.6 .004 16,318.3
R&D spending per worker
(2000 constant thousand 
US$)
20.3 6.1 51.7 .013 879.1
Number of workers 3,512.4 221.0 10,933.4 1 85,813.0
Tangible fixed asset per 
worker (2000 constant 
thousand US$)
85.0 45.2 110.4 .599 982.2
Notes: 1) The number of patent application of 75 percentile in the sample is 4.
       2) Purchasing power parity used here is 753.2 Korean Won per US dollar 
of 2000. 
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS DURING 1990-2006 (obs. ＝ 529)
patent applications per year. The average value of R&D expenditure is 
180.9 million US dollars, whereas the median firm spends no more than 
1.4 million US dollars. R&D intensity (measured by R&D spending per 
worker), firm size (measured by number of workers), and capital intensity 
(measured by tangible fixed assets per worker) exhibit asymmetry across 
firm size as well. The standard deviation is larger than the mean value 
of each variable. The features of the data suggest that the over-dispersion 
of variance is substantial, and that the negative binomial model fit better 
than the simple Poisson regression model.
B. Empirical Results
The response of incumbents to patent reform is measured based on 
the number of patent applications. Table 2 presents the estimation results 
based on a negative binomial fixed effect model under various specifica- 
tions.4 The fixed effects for each firm with a constant term are not re- 
ported for simplicity.
We first estimated the effect of R&D expenditure on patent application, 
4 For the robustness of empirical results, we also estimated the regression models 
by using the negative binomial random effect model. The empirical results were 
almost the same as the results of the fixed effect model. The results are avail- 
able from the authors upon request.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LnRndr
(Log R&D)
.374 
(.027) 
***
 
 
 
 
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
 
 
 
 
　
 
 
 
 
 
LnRndrwk
(Log R&D per 
worker)
　
　
　
　
.224 
(.023) 
***
 
.217
(.052) 
***
　
.199
(.054)
***
　
.184
(.054)
***
　
.184
(.054)
***
　
LnCapint
(Log P&E per 
worker)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.180 
(.081) 
**
 
.140
(.085)
*
 
.154
(.082)
*
 
.154
(.083)
*
 
LnSize
(Log workers)
　
　
　
　
 
 
 
 
 .440
(.046) 
***
　
 .468
(.049)
***
　
 .402
(.061)
***
　
 .402
(.061)
***
　
Post-1994
(Dummy for 
post-1994)
　
　
　
　
 
 
 
 
　
　
　
　
.296
(.191) 
#
 
.340
(.179) 
*
　
.339
(.181) 
*
　
Dummy for 
Samsung-LG
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.696
(.366)
*
 
.697
(.366)
*
 
Dummy for 1998  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.006
(.194)
 
 
Log-likelihood
Wald chi-squared
No of obs.
No of firms
-1034.5
188.4
529
35
-1090.0
44.58
529
35
-1027.2
228.3
529
35
-1026.0
232.0
529
35
-1024.2
266.4
529
35
-1024.2
266.4
529
35
Note: ***, **, * and # indicates 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% significance level, 
respectively. The figures in parentheses are standard errors.
TABLE 2
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF PATENTING PROPENSITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE＝NUMBER OF PATENT APPLICATIONS
which indicates the estimated elasticity of patent applications with respect 
to R&D spending. The estimated coefficient is .374, which is somewhat 
lower than the estimates for the US. Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986) 
obtained an R&D elasticity of .52 for a sample of 642 firms. Hausman, 
Hall, and Griliches (1984) obtained an elasticity of .75 by using the nega- 
tive binomial regression model for 128 large manufacturing firms, which 
represented the entire manufacturing sector of the 1970s.5 Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) obtained an R&D elasticity of .989 for a sample of 95 
5 The elasticity of patent applications with respect to R&D spending for the 
large-firm sample was .329, with standard error of .043 by using the same vari- 
able in column (1).
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US semiconductor firms from 1979 to 1995. The estimated patent pro- 
pensity with respect to R&D spending in developing countries, such as 
Korea, is lower than developed countries. The difference in R&D elasticity 
between developing and developed countries may reflect the “catching 
up” nature of the industry in developing countries, particularly limita- 
tions in research related to equipment and workers. 
In columns (2) to (6), R&D intensity, which is measured by R&D ex- 
penditure per worker (LnRndrwk) instead of R&D expenditure, is in- 
cluded in the regression models as an indicator of innovation activity or 
an input to produce patent applications. According to empirical results, 
the innovation activity shows a statistically significant and positive effect 
on patent applications. The estimated coefficients of R&D intensity were 
stable and ranged from .184 to .224 at 1% significance level.
Regression results also show that capital intensity (defined by plant 
and equipment (P&E) fixed asset per worker) significantly influences the 
propensity to patent application. The estimated coefficient in columns 
(5) and (6) is .154, which is statistically significant at 10% level. This 
value implies that, other things being equal, the firm with higher capital 
intensity is more likely to patent for their inventive output. The regres- 
sion result is consistent with Hall and Ziedonis (2001). Further, this 
finding suggests that capital-intensive firms in Korea are also concerned 
about the patent “hold-up” problem, which could be caused by the nuis- 
ance patent litigation of potential competitors, and are more likely to invest 
aggressively in patent applications. 
Of note are regression results for the effects of firm size and a dummy 
variable for dominant firms. The estimates of firm size and the dummy 
variable for Samsung and LG are statistically significant at the 1% and 
10% levels, respectively, and the coefficients are larger than those of any 
other variables. These results indicate that Samsung and LG tended to 
file patent applications more often than any other firm, and even after 
controlling the Samsung and LG effects, a statistically significant scale 
effect on patenting behavior existed. According to Hall and Ziedonis 
(2000), large firms obtain the benefit of economies of scale in patenting 
because of the large fixed cost of initiating and maintaining legal pro- 
cedures.
Finally, the coefficient of the post-1994 dummy variable showed sta- 
tistical significance at the 10% level. This result implied that, on average, 
the firms increased the number of patent applications after the 1994 
patent reform, and that aggressive patent portfolio races occurred among 
incumbents after the patent reform in 1994 even after controlling for 
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　Variable
Small-size incumbents Large-size incumbents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LnRndrwk
 
.404 
(.088) 
***
 
.395 
(.092) 
***
 
.160 
(.075) 
**
 
.125 
(.068) 
*
 
LnCapint
 
.094 
(.126) 
 
 
.091 
(.126) 
 
 
.193 
(.115)
*
 
.125 
(.115) 
 
 
LnSize
 
 .737
(.194) 
***
 
 .736
(.194) 
***
 
 .572
(.094) 
***
 
 .643
(.098) 
***
 
Post-1994
 
 
 
 
 
.164 
(.463) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.445 
(.219) 
**
 
Log-likelihood
Wald chi-squared
No of obs.
No of firms
-363.9 
61.9 
382
30
 
 
 
-363.8 
61.18 
382
30
 
 
 
-629.7 
98.9 
132
10
 
 
 
-627.6 
99.8 
132
10
 
 
 
Note: 1) ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respect- 
ively. The figures in parentheses are standard errors.
      2) The dummy variables for year-1998 and Samsung-LG were dropped 
from the regression equation since those variables were not statistically 
significant.
TABLE 3
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF PATENTING PROPENSITY BY FIRM SIZE
other variables, such as R&D intensity, capital intensity, and firm size. 
However, the effect of patent reform is asymmetric such that large firms 
were the only firms responding to the reform. We divided the sample into 
two groups, large versus small to medium-sized firms. Table 3 presents 
the regression results of these two groups. The overall results in Table 
3 are consistent with the results in Table 2. R&D intensity and firm 
size effect are statistically significant in both groups, and the estimated 
coefficients of firm size in both groups are larger than R&D intensity. 
However, the 1994 patent reform is only effective for large incumbents. 
The estimated coefficient of the post-1994 dummy variable for large in- 
cumbents is 0.445 and statistically significant at the 5% level, whereas 
the dummy variable for small to medium-sized firms does not show any 
statistical significance. This result indicated that the stronger patent 
enforcement of 1994 is effective only for large firms, but not for small 
to medium-sized firms.
However, to interpret the effect of the patent reform, we have to keep 
in mind that the Korean economy experienced serious economic downturn 
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　Variable
Period I:
1990–1993
Before
reform
Period II:
1994–1997
Short-term
after reform
Period III:
1998–2001
Medium-term
after reform
Period IV:
2002–2006
Long-term
after reform
LnRndrwk
 
.515 
(.155) 
***
 
.015 
(.088) 
 
 
.619 
(.219) 
***
 
.248 
(.106) 
**
 
LnCapint
 
.585 
(.409) 
 
 
.966 
(.288) 
***
 
 .101
(.267) 
 
 
-.127
(.178) 
 
 
LnSize
 
.422
(.256) 
 
 
 .473 
(.132) 
***
 
 .122
(.151) 
 
 
 .699
(.103) 
***
 
Log-likelihood
Wald chi2
No of obs.
No of firms
-100.4
45.2
40
10
 
 
 
-152.7
31.5
75
19
 
 
 
-185.3
19.6
96
24
 
 
 
-282.8
 66.7
157
32
 
 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respect- 
ively. The figures in parentheses are standard errors.
TABLE 4
PATENTING PROPENSITY BY FOUR-YEAR INTERVALS
(the so-called financial crisis) that resulted in substantial changes in 
industrial structures and firm governance during 1998 to 2001. During 
this period, the shares of the foreign ownership of Korean firms dramat- 
ically increased, and many scholastic papers argued that the innovation 
behavior of Korean firms was qualitatively changed (Chang and Shin 
2002). To incorporate the possible change of firm innovation behavior 
attributable to the “financial crisis,” we separated the sample period into 
four 4-year periods, and ran separate regressions. With this analysis, 
we expected that we could show how firm behavior changed after the 
patent reform as well as the main motivation in the upsurge of patent 
applications.
Table 4 presents the regression results with separate periods. The 
first period, 1990-1993, reflects the patenting behavior of firms before 
the patent reform. We may call this period the “weaker patent regime.” 
The second period, 1994-1997, indicates patenting behavior during the 
pro-patent regime, which reflects short-term response to the pro-patent 
regime. The third period, 1998-2001, as mentioned above, represents 
the period of the Korean financial crisis, which might have a substantial 
economic impact on firm behavior. We observed a substantial decrease 
in patent application filing during this period, and we identified which 
variable is the most significant factor to explain firm patenting behavior. 
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Finally, the 2002-2006 period indicates the period after the financial 
crisis. The last period in this paper indicate the relatively long-term 
effect of the patent reform in 1994 on patenting.6
The regression results in Table 4 demonstrate significant changes in 
the patent application behavior of incumbents. From 1994 to 1997 (period 
II ), which is the period right after the patent reform, patent propensity 
is substantially increased, but the effect of R&D intensity (LnRndrwk) 
on patenting disappeared, although this effect is statistically significant 
during the first period (before the patent reform). The capital intensity 
and size of firms demonstrate significant effect on patent application, but 
this effect is not significant during the first period. The estimated coef- 
ficient of capital intensity soared to 0.966 from 0.585, and showed sta- 
tistical significance at 1% level. During the second period, firm size 
(Lnsize) also exhibits a statistically significant and positive effect on pa- 
tent applications. These results are consistent with the strategic response 
hypothesis of Hall and Ziedonis (2001) in which capital-intensive firms 
with large scale are more likely to increase patent applications under a 
stronger patent enforcement regime. 
However, the strategic response of large incumbents was observed only 
in the second period (1994-1997), which implied a short-term response 
to stronger patent enforcement in our model. During the third and fourth 
periods, the estimated coefficient of capital intensity lost its statistical 
significance, whereas R&D intensity regained its significance. The esti- 
mation results provided indirect evidence that firm behavior in patenting 
changed during and after the financial crisis as the capital intensity vari- 
able, which represents firm strategic responses lost its statistical signifi- 
cance even though it exhibited a significant correlation with patenting 
propensity during the second period. Whether the switch of patenting 
motivation is the result of either the financial crisis or the long-term 
effect of stronger patent reform being unclear, the patent reform initiated 
a strategic response of large incumbents during the short term at least.
In summary, regression results show that the 1994 Korean patent 
6 The strategic response disappeared in periods III and IV, and the importance 
of R&D intensity and economies of scale increases in period IV. Korean firms 
changed their economic behavior after the economic crisis, but the reasons are 
multifaceted. Some argue that the substantial increase of foreign direct invest- 
ment was one of the most important factors, whereas others insist that struc- 
tural change in industrial distribution was one of the most important factors. 
The examination of the reason is beyond our study. Thus, we defer analysis as 
a future research topic.
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reform affected the patent propensity of firms (Table 2). However, the 
effect was limited to large incumbents and only in the short term (Tables 
3 and 4).7 These results supported the spirit of the strategic response 
hypothesis such that patent propensity was not associated with increased 
R&D intensity at least for the short term after the patent reform in 1994. 
Firm size was also an important factor in explaining the patenting pro- 
pensity of firms, and suggested that economies of scale in applying for 
patents are important factors in explaining the increased number of 
patent applications in small and large incumbents (Table 3).
V. Conclusion 
This paper examined the response of incumbents to the 1994 Korean 
patent reform in the electronics and related equipment industry. The 
main question of the study focused on whether stronger patent enforce- 
ment effectively induced more innovation activities of incumbents. We ex- 
plored the causes of the significant upsurge in the number of patent 
applications immediately following the 1994 patent reform in Korea.
The 1994 patent reform in Korea did not stimulate the innovation ac- 
tivity of private sectors, but was accompanied with a strategic response 
of large incumbents by aggressively filing patent applications without 
increasing R&D intensity. R&D intensity was an important factor for firm 
patenting behavior during the first period (before the patent reform), but 
it lost its statistical significance during the second period (after the patent 
reform, 1994-1997), which represented the short-term response of firms 
to stronger patent reform. Capital intensity, which was introduced to test 
the strategic response hypothesis, showed statistically significant and 
positive correlation with the number of patent applications only during 
the second period. This finding implied that, all other things being equal, 
7 We also ran regressions that separated the sample with firm size and each 
period. The regression results were consistent with Table 4. For large incum- 
bents, strategic behaviors attributable to the 1994 patent reform were observable 
only in period II (1994-1997) as capital intensity variable is statistically signifi- 
cant at the 1% level only in period II. However, for small firms, capital intensity 
related to patent applications showed no statistical significance during any sample 
period, which implied that the 1994 Korean patent reform influenced the patent 
propensity of firms, but the effect was limited to large incumbents and only during 
short term. These results are consistent with the spirit of the strategic response 
hypothesis. However, the sample size of each regression analysis seemed too small 
to warrant the credibility of statistical analysis. We present the regression results 
in Appendix.
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the firm with large fixed capital asset was more likely to patent under a 
stronger patent regime. However, for small incumbents, we found no 
statistically significant results during the sample period. Large firms 
with large fixed costs responded to stronger patent enforcement in ac- 
cordance with the strategic response hypothesis.
Empirical results also suggested the importance of firm size in pa- 
tenting propensity. After the economic crisis (the third period), the mag- 
nitude of the estimated coefficient of firm size increased and showed 
statistical significance for both large and small incumbents, which implied 
that economies of scale are increasingly important factors in explaining 
patenting propensity.
The R&D intensity of large incumbents was not significantly correlated 
with patenting propensity during the second period, but it appeared to 
have a significant correlation with patent propensity during the third 
and fourth periods (1998-2001 and 2002-2006). By contrast, capital in- 
tensity was statistically significant only during the second period, 1994- 
1997, but not in the third and fourth period, which suggested that the 
strategic motive of large incumbents in patenting was sustained only for 
a short time, and that the motivation for patenting behavior has changed 
over time. R&D intensity rather than “strategic motive” became a more 
important factor to determine patenting behavior during and after the 
financial crisis. The change could be the result of substantial changes 
in firm structure and foreign ownership during the financial crisis or to 
the long-term effect of stronger patent enforcement. Even though the 
regression results confirmed that large incumbents with high fixed costs 
strategically responded to stronger patent enforcement in the short term, 
we need further investigation to understand whether the observed increase 
in R&D intensity comes from the long-term response to stronger patent 
enforcement. 
( Received 27 June 2012; Revised 29 November 2012; Accepted 30 
November 2012)
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　Variable
Period I:
1990–1993
Before
reform
Period II:
1994–1997
Short-term
after reform
Period III:
1998–2001
Medium-term
after reform
Period IV:
2002–2006
Long-term
after reform
　Small-size firm
LnRndrwk
 
.722 
(.997) 
 
 
.509 
(.283) 
*
 
.757 
(.315) 
***
 
.120 
(.197) 
 
 
LnCapint
 
.400
(3.684) 
 
 
-.201 
(.718) 
 
 
 .471
(.334) 
 
 
-.085
(.227) 
 
 
LnSize
 
6.047
(4.481) 
 
 
 .579
(.516) 
 
 
 .315
(.498) 
 
 
 1.505
(.434) 
***
 
Log-likelihood
Wald chi2
(p-value)
No of obs.
No of firms
-7.3 
2.1
(.543) 
12
3
 
 
 
 
-32.0 
3.9
(.275) 
47
12
 
 
 
 
-63.7 
10.8
(.013) 
72
18
 
 
 
 
-130.0 
 13.1
(.004) 
117
25
 
 
 
 
Large-size firm
LnRndrwk
 
.611 
(.174) 
***
 
-.069
(.075) 
 
 
.695 
(.353) 
**
 
.251 
(.141) 
*
 
LnCapint
 
.456 
(.428) 
 
 
1.122
(.282) 
***
 
 -1.272
(.502) 
**
 
 -.294
(.300) 
 
 
LnSize
 
 .062
( .386) 
 
 
.124 
( .308) 
 
 
 .886
(.392) 
**
 
 .982 
(.192) 
***
 
Log-likelihood
Wald chi2
(p-value)
No of obs.
No of firms
-90.7 
   43.8
(.000)
28
7
 
 
 
-116.2 
16.4
(.001)
28
7
 
 
 
-112.7 
13.1
(.004)
23
6
 
 
 
-136.0 
 55.0
(.000)
 36
8
 
 
 
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
RESULTS BY FIRM SIZE AND FOUR-YEAR INTERVALS
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
The figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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